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JUDICIAL SCHIZOPHRENIA IN 
CORPORATE LAW: CONFUSING 
THE STANDARD OF CARE WITH 
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
FRED W. TRIEM* 
Courts are confusing the Business Judgment Rule with the 
standard of care that governs the conduct of corporate directors 
and officers.  The Alaska Supreme Court declared in recent 
dictum that the Business Judgment Rule has been codified in 
Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b), the directors’ duty-of-care 
statute.  The court deviated from well-established principles of 
corporate law by confusing the corporate directors’ statutory 
standard of care with the Business Judgment Rule, a widely-
applied, but uncodified, common law rule about the standard of 
directors’ liability for their mistakes. The former is an ex-ante 
measuring stick by which directors’ decisions are guided; the latter 
is a presumption of correctness and a safe harbor that protects 
business decisions from ex-post review in the courts.  This 
Comment identifies this common error of law, describes the 
difference between these two concepts, explains why many state 
and federal courts across the nation are confused, and credits the 
courts that have already discovered the error.  It concludes with 
some reasons why the Business Judgment Rule should not be 
codified. 
I.  INTRODUCTION: A FIERY BEGINNING 
The Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”) first appeared in 
Alaska in 1975 after a fire destroyed a small factory in Fairbanks 
that was owned by Alaska Plastics, Inc.1 The fire caused the end of 
production at the factory, terminated operation of the enterprise, 
and triggered the beginning of a lawsuit that brought the arrival of 
the BJR in Alaska.2  To Alaska Plastics’ everlasting woe, its 
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 1. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980). 
 2. Id. at 270. 
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directors had decided not to obtain any fire insurance on the 
facility.3  Annoyed by this foolish decision, Patricia Coppock, a 
minority shareholder, filed a derivative action against the directors 
in which she complained that the directors had breached their duty 
of care.4 
In Alaska Plastics, the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the 
trial court’s rejection of the dissident shareholder’s complaint 
about lack of fire insurance and other directorial misconduct.5  The 
supreme court held that the directors’ decision not to insure the 
property was protected by the BJR, and therefore it would not be 
reviewed by the court.6  This was the first time the Alaska Supreme 
Court had discussed or applied the BJR.  The court’s most recent 
BJR case, Shields v. Cape Fox Corp.,7 is substantially more 
controversial, as it mistakenly asserts that the BJR is codified in 
Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b),8 confusing the common law 
rule with the codified corporate directors’ standard of care.9 
This Comment traces the history of the BJR in Alaska.  It 
explains where and how the court has erred in its definition of the 
rule; it explains the difference between two concepts—standard of 
directors’ care and standard of directors’ liability—and their 
separate treatment in the Model Act.10 It also collects examples of 
the same judicial misunderstanding from the case law of other 
states.  It concludes that the BJR has not been codified in Alaska 
nor in most other U.S. jurisdictions, although there have been re-
cent suggestions to do so in the Model Act11 and in the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance.12  Finally, this 
Comment provides reasons why the BJR should not be codified. 
 
 3. Id. at 273. 
 4. Id. at 278. 
 5. Id. The dissident shareholder complained that “the directors failed to 
insure the Fairbanks plant, they kept large reserves of cash in noninterest-bearing 
checking accounts, and they loaned an employee money at a rate below prevailing 
rates of interest.”  Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002). 
 8. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006). 
 9. See Shields, 42 P.3d at 1083. 
 10. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2005). 
 11. Id. § 8.31. 
 12. 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (1994). 
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II.  A WRONG TURN IN ALASKA’S CORPORATE LAW 
Since its first appearance in the Alaska Plastics decision, the 
Business Judgment Rule has received only occasional mention in 
subsequent decisions of the supreme court.13  That is, until the court 
decided Shields v. Cape Fox Corp.14 in 2002.  In Shields, the court 
confused the BJR with the directors’ statutory standard of care that 
is codified in Alaska Statute section 10.06.450(b).15  The court 
erroneously referred to a statutory formulation of the BJR: “The 
business judgment rule is set out in AS 10.06.450(b).  It requires a 
director to use ‘the care . . . that an ordinarily prudent person in a 
like position would use under similar circumstances.’”16 
For the reasons explained below,17 this dictum is contrary to 
the great weight of modern corporate law and should be 
repudiated.  However, Alaska is not alone in making this mistake; 
courts in several other jurisdictions have made the same error.18 
 
 13. In the twenty years after Alaska Plastics, the BJR received brief mention 
in four reported decisions. See Bennett v. Weimar, 975 P.2d 691, 697 nn.21–22 
(Alaska 1999) (applying the BJR to condominium associations and giving a useful 
statement of the rule); Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 960 P.2d 606, 608 n.1 
(Alaska 1998) (quoting an argument of counsel in which the phrase “business 
judgment rule” appears); Wirum & Cash, Architects v. Cash, 837 P.2d 692, 702 
(Alaska 1992) (“Alaska recognizes the business judgement [sic] rule.”); O’Buck v. 
Cottonwood Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 750 P.2d 813, 817 n.4 (Alaska 1988) (analogizing 
between the BJR and condominium association rule). The next decision in which 
the term “business judgment rule” appeared was Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92. 
 14. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091 (“The business judgment rule is set out in AS 
10.06.450(b).”).  In the five years since its decision in Shields, the Alaska Supreme 
Court has not applied the BJR, although the term “business judgment rule” does 
appear in three recent decisions. See Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. Waterman, 87 P.3d 
820, 822 (Alaska 2004); Quality Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of Transp. and 
Pub. Facilities, 71 P.3d 865, 876 (Alaska 2003); Jerue v. Millett, 66 P.3d 736, 750 
(Alaska 2003). 
 15. Alaska Statute section 10.06.450, titled “Board of directors; duty of care; 
right of inspection; failure to dissent,” provides, in relevant part: 
(b) A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a 
member of a committee of the board on which the director may serve, in 
good faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation, and with the care, including reasonable 
inquiry, that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use 
under similar circumstances. 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (2006). 
 16. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92 (emphasis added). 
 17. See discussion infra Parts II.B, II.D. 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.  Examples are collected in the Appendix. 
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A. What is the Business Judgment Rule? 
The essence of the BJR is deference to directors’ decision-
making based on judicial unwillingness to re-examine a business 
decision and judicial reluctance to discourage directors from risk-
taking.19  The BJR is characterized by a number of features.20  First, 
the BJR applies to business decisions that have been made by 
corporate directors and officers by supplying a presumption of 
correctness.21  Second, the BJR requires a judgment or decision.22  
 
 19. There are three principal formulations of the Business Judgment Rule: (1) 
the Delaware rule, (2) the ALI rule, and (3) the Model Act rule.  See R. Franklin 
Balotti & James J. Hanks, Jr., Rejudging The Business Judgment Rule, 48 BUS. 
LAW. 1337, 1337–39 (1993) (explaining the “three major positions on the business 
judgment rule”); see also Meredith M. Brown & William I. Phillips, The Business 
Judgment Rule: Burks v. Lasker and Other Recent Developments, 6 J. Corp. L. 453, 
454–61 (1981) (discussing the policy behind the business judgment rule and 
outlining the necessary conditions for its application); Charles Hansen, The Duty 
of Care, the Business Judgment Rule, and The American Law Institute Corporate 
Governance Project, 48 BUS. LAW. 1355, 1363–68 (1993) (outlining the elements of 
the BJR). 
 20. An introduction to the BJR can be found in several popular texts and 
treatises on the law of corporations.  See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. 
BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 8.03[C], at 209–14 (2d ed. 
2004); 1 AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c) & cmt. at 172–86 (providing the 
ALI’s formulation of the BJR); WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 592–634 (7th ed. 
1995); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS L. HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON 
CORPORATIONS § 15.07 (2d ed. 2003); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. 
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 93–100 (1991); 
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 13–17 
(1976) (discussing various types of business decisions); ROBERT W. 
HAMILTON & JONATHAN R. MACEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CORPORATIONS 800–817 (8th ed. 2003); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., 
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 1036–40, 
at 37–52 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 3A 1994); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS IN A NUTSHELL §§ 14.4–.5, (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
HAMILTON NUTSHELL] (distinguishing the standard of care and the BJR); HARRY 
G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 242 (3d ed. 
1983); DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J., THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE 
CONTROL—A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 71–73 (1986); JAMES 
A. FANTO, DIRECTORS’ AND OFFICERS’ LIABILITY § 2:2.3[A][3], at 2-26 (2d ed. 
2006) (noting that the rationale for the BJR “is institutional, economic, and 
psychological”). 
 21. See HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20, § 14.5, at 453.  The 
presumption component of the BJR is developed in Balotti & Hanks, supra note 
19, at 1339–50.  It is also discussed in DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOV-
ERNANCE § 7.13 (1993) (discussing “something above and beyond the routine 
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Third, the BJR protects corporate directors and officers from 
liability for mistakes that were made in business decisions, even 
when such a decision proves to have been unsound or downright 
erroneous.23  Finally, the BJR supplies judicial restraint and 
abstention, for it furnishes a deferential standard of review by 
which courts will abstain from second guessing the directors’ 
business decisions.24 
The BJR insulates corporate directors from those decisions 
that are within their authority and are not tainted by fraud or self-
dealing.25  The BJR is a venerable common law rule26 that is 
recognized and applied by courts everywhere to protect directors 
when they are acting within the scope of their corporate authority: 
The rule is simply that the business judgment of the directors 
will not be challenged or overturned by courts or shareholders, 
 
presumption of regularity”).  The BJR protects officers as well as directors.  Id. 
§ 7.03 & n.31.  But see Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Officers and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 60 BUS. LAW. 439, 458–69 (2005) (arguing against the application 
of the business judgment rule to protect corporate officers who are not also 
directors). 
 22. See, e.g., DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, NO SEAT AT THE TABLE 56 (2007) 
(“One salient feature of the rule is that the directors must have made a judgment 
or decision—the rule does not protect directors who do nothing.”). 
 23. HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20, §14.5, at 453 (“Decisions made 
by the board of directors upon reasonable information and with some 
rationality do not give rise to directorial liability even if they turn out badly 
or disastrously.”). Even the fertile young minds of law students could not devise 
a better example of a business decision gone awry than the parsimonious mistake 
of Alaska Plastics’ directors: not buying fire insurance to protect its only 
production facility. 
 24. The abstention feature of the BJR is developed in Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004). 
 25. For a useful summary of the rule and its purpose as a shield to protect 
directors, see Gries Sports Enter., Inc. v. Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 
N.E.2d 959, 963 (Ohio 1986) (“The business judgment rule is a principle of 
corporate law that has been part of the common law for at least one hundred fifty 
years.”).  The historical roots of the BJR are reviewed in S. Samuel Arsht, The 
Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97–100 (1979). 
 26. The common law origin of the BJR is discussed in MELVIN ARON 
EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 38–39 (1988) (giving a brief 
statement of the Business Judgment Rule and its policy bases).  In the era before 
codification vel non became a disputed topic, the rule’s common law genesis was 
axiomatic: “Under the common law, courts are disposed to give directors a wide 
latitude in the management of a corporation’s affairs, as long as they reasonably 
exercise an honest, unbiased judgment.  This is often referred to as the ‘business 
judgment rule.’”  1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS 
AND DIRECTORS, § 1.08, at 20 (3d ed. 1978) (footnote omitted). 
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and the directors will not be held liable for the consequences of 
their exercise of business judgment—even for judgments that 
appear to have been clear mistakes—unless certain exceptions 
apply.  Put another way, the rule is “a presumption that in 
making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action was taken in the best interests of the company.27 
The exceptions referred to by Dean Clark are “managerial fraud 
and self-dealing.”28 
The BJR provides a safe harbor to directors only for decisions 
in which they have discretion and for which they are permitted to 
choose between rational business alternatives.  The correct 
expression of the BJR is seen in Alaska Plastics: “Judges are not 
business experts, a fact which has become expressed in the 
so-called ‘business judgment rule.’  The essence of that doctrine is 
that courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for that of the 
board of directors unless the board’s decisions are unreasonable.”29 
Alaska Plastics provides an excellent example of judicial 
deference to business decisions.  In that case, the shareholder-
plaintiff complained that the defendant-directors were negligent in 
 
 27. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW, §3.4, at 123–24 (1986) 
(quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)) (footnote omitted); see 
also BRANSON, supra note 21, §7.01–.17; see generally, 1–2 DENNIS J. BLOCK, 
NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: 
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (5th ed. 1998).  Two frequently 
cited expressions of the BJR in the case law are Aronson and Joy v. North, 692 
F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982).  A useful analysis can be found in United Artists 
Theater Co. v. Walton, 315 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2003).  The BJR is the focal point 
of the most famous—some might say infamous—corporate law case in our life 
time: Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 871–73 (Del. 1985) (holding the BJR is 
not a defense for directors who acted with haste, failed to consult outside 
professionals, and failed to make adequate inquiry about the terms of a proposed 
merger). 
 28. CLARK, supra note 27, §3.5, at 140. 
 29. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980) (citation 
omitted).  The introductory phrase “judges are not business experts,” which 
Justice Connor derives from Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 
1919), is not the BJR but merely a statement of one principal policy basis for the 
rule (among several).  This often-quoted phrase is discussed in Bainbridge, supra 
note 24, at 117–23 (noting that “this too is an incomplete explanation for the 
business judgment rule” and offering an alternative that judges “have an incentive 
to duck these cases” because “many judges are ‘radically incompetent’”); id. at 
119 (quoting Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of 
Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 754, 758 (2000) (noting that “courts 
have trouble understanding the simplest of business relationships” and that 
“[t]heir frequent failure to understand transactions is well-documented”)). 
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failing to insure company property—a plant in Fairbanks—and that 
they kept large amounts of cash in non-interest-bearing checking 
accounts, thus violating the directors’ duty of care.30  The court 
rejected these arguments for the reason expressed in the quoted 
passage above:31 the directors have discretion about insurance and 
banking practices, and a court should show deference because 
“[j]udges are not business experts.”32 
B. Distinguishing the Directors’ Standard of Care and 
the Business Judgment Rule 
The key difference between the standard of care and the 
Business Judgment Rule is that the standard of care defines ex ante 
the conduct to which directors must aspire while the BJR is an ex 
post standard of review applied by the courts.33  Although some 
courts fail to distinguish between the standard of care and the BJR, 
legal scholars have recognized the distinction between these two 
doctrines.34  The standard of care and the BJR are often confused 
because “[i]n many or most areas of law, standards of conduct and 
standards of review are identical.”35  But these standards are not 
identical in the law of corporations: 
 
 30. Coppock, 621 P.2d at 278. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id.  Alaska Plastics also explains that the BJR does not protect directors 
who violate the rights of shareholders. For example, in Alaska Plastics, the court 
recognized that management could not avoid liability if it violated the 
shareholders’ right to equal treatment in the matter of dividends: “[I]f a 
stockholder is being unjustly deprived of dividends that should be his, a court of 
equity will not permit management to cloak itself in the immunity of the business 
judgment rule.”  Id. (quoting Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 1959)) 
(alteration in original). 
 33. Elizabeth S. Miller & Thomas E. Rutledge, The Duty Of Finest Loyalty 
And Reasonable Decisions: The Business Judgment Rule In Unincorporated 
Business Organizations?, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 343, 352–53 (2005) (“It is important 
to note the difference between the standard of care, which is the standard of 
conduct expected of directors in their decision making, and the business judgment 
rule, which is the standard of review that determines whether directors will be 
held liable for a poor decision.”); see also LEWIS D. SOLOMON, DONALD E. 
SCHWARTZ, JEFFREY D. BAUMAN, & ELLIOT J. WEISS, CORPORATIONS: LAW 
AND POLICY, 705–710 (4th ed. 1998) (distinguishing between due care and the 
BJR). 
 34. A useful discussion is found in HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20, 
§§ 14.4–.5. 
 35. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 602 (“A standard of conduct states 
how an actor should conduct a given activity or play a given role.  A standard of 
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An identity between standards of conduct and standards of 
review is so common that it is easy to overlook the fact that the 
two kinds of standards may diverge in any given area—that is, 
the standard of conduct that states how an actor should conduct 
himself may differ from the standard of review by which courts 
determine whether to impose liability on the basis of the actor’s 
conduct. . . . 
The duty of care is a leading example of this divergence.36 
To illustrate, Professor Douglas Branson explains that a 
director’s conduct must meet a standard of due care: 
[T]he standard of care applicable to corporate directors remains 
due care. As the Model Business Corporation Act and the 
Indiana statute phrase it, a director is to discharge her duties 
“with the care an ordinarily reasonably prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances.” The 
standard of conduct is not “slight care,” or “gross negligence,” or 
anything other than due care. . . . With that established, the 
business judgment rule may be the de facto standard of conduct 
in cases in which directors are proactive, making a judgment or 
decision, that may be a deliberative decision to take no action, as 
opposed to cases of complete nonfeasance.37 
The directors have many duties under the standard of care, 
including the duty of monitoring, the duty of inquiry, the duty to 
make reasonable and prudent decisions regarding matters upon 
which the board is obligated or chooses to act, and also the duty to 
employ a reasonable decision-making process.38 
 
review states the test a court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to 
determine whether to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.”). 
 36. Id. (“For example, the standard of conduct that governs an automobile 
driver is that he should drive carefully.  Correspondingly, the standard of review in 
a liability claim against a driver is whether he drove carefully.  The standard of 
conduct that governs an agent who engages in a transaction with his principal that 
involves the subject matter of the agency is that the agent must deal fairly.  
Correspondingly, the standard of review in a liability claim by the principal against 
the agent based on such a transaction is whether the agent dealt fairly.”).  
Professor Eisenberg’s complete explanation can be found in Melvin Aron 
Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in 
Corporate Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
 37. Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule – The Business Judgment 
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 631, 638 (2002) (footnote omitted); see also 
RICHARD W. JENNINGS & RICHARD M. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 171–99 (5th ed. 1979). 
 38. See CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 20, at 602; 1 AM. LAW INST., supra 
note 12, § 4.01(a) (“A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform 
the director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she 
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care 
that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a 
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In contrast, the BJR is a presumption of correctness for 
business decisions applied by the courts to shield directors from 
liability, even if the decision is unreasonable.  The BJR precludes 
the court from examining the merits of a business decision unless 
the directors were grossly negligent. 
Where the business judgment rule applies, a director will not be 
held liable for a decision, “even one that is unreasonable” and 
results in a loss to the corporation, so long as the director was 
not grossly negligent in reaching the decision.  Furthermore, 
while the plaintiff is required to show gross negligence in order 
to overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule, 
proof of a grossly negligent decision alone is not sufficient to set 
aside the decision or yield an award of damages.  Liability may 
be avoided in the absence of causation or damages, or where the 
directors can establish the fairness of the challenged transaction.  
The decision, in such instances, will be respected, and the 
directors will not be exposed to personal liability.39 
According to the official comments to the Model Business 
Corporation Act, the drafters purposely left it to the courts to sort 
out the relationship, if any, between directors’ statutory duty of 
care and the BJR.40  Table I summarizes the difference between 
these two concepts. 
 
like position and under similar circumstances.”).  The American Law Institute’s 
formulation of the duty of care is similar to the Model Act’s, and thus it is similar 
to the law of Alaska and most states. 
 39. Miller, supra note 33, at 352–53 (footnotes omitted); see also SOLOMON ET 
AL., supra note 33, at 705–710 (distinguishing between due care and the BJR). 
 40. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.) 
(“The elements of the business judgment rule and the circumstances for its 
application are continuing to be developed by the courts.”). 
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Table I:  Differences between the standard of care and the BJR: 
 
Directors’ Standard of Care Business Judgment Rule 
Standard of conduct for 
directors & officers 
Standard of review for use 
by courts 
Guidelines to advise a 
director or officer in 
contemplation of board 
action 
Liability test a court should 
apply when it reviews a 
director’s or officer’s con-
duct 
How a director should 
conduct a given activity or 
make a decision 
Limits the use of liability 
rules against directors to 
evaluate their performance 
Fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty 
Not a description of a duty 
or standard 
Aspirational goals for 
present and future conduct; 
guides directors 
Presumption of correctness 
of completed acts; a safe 
harbor to protect directors 
Requires an informed 
judgment or decision 
An abstention doctrine in 
which courts will not 
interfere with business 
decisions 
Forward looking; operates 
ex ante 
Retrospective; operates ex 
post 
Codified; MBCA § 8.30; 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450. 
Not codified; a common law 
rule  
 
C. The Standard Matters 
When a court uses the wrong legal standard, confusing the 
standard of conduct with the standard of review, the mistake can 
be outcome determinative.  In Shields, the Supreme Court of 
Alaska compounded the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction 
(which incorporated the wrong legal standard) by approving the 
instruction with the mistaken holding that it made no difference: 
Defendants contend that Jury Instruction Nos. 14 and 15 
concerning Martinez’s liability as a director of the corporation 
were plain error because they did not reflect the business 
judgment rule. The business judgment rule is set out in AS 
10.06.450(b).  It requires a director to use the care. . .that an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances.  As such, liability under the business 
judgment rule does not differ appreciably from negligence 
liability—the standard used in Instructions Nos. 14 and 15.  Thus 
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it was not plain error to fail to instruct on the business judgment 
rule.41 
The court’s mistake was in saying that liability under the business 
judgment rule “does not differ appreciably” from negligence 
liability.42  The court was flat wrong in equating the BJR with a 
classical negligence standard.  Most courts that have reached the 
issue have said that a plaintiff who sues a director must overcome 
the BJR’s presumption of correctness and then must establish gross 
negligence (followed by causation and damages) in order to 
recover.43 
In a suit against a corporate director or officer for breach of 
the duty of care, the plaintiff cannot simply show a violation of the 
duty of care statute, such as section 10.06.450(b).  Instead, the 
plaintiff must show gross negligence to overcome the director’s 
protection of the BJR.  Without such a showing, the BJR’s safe 
harbor insulates the director from liability for defective decision 
making.  In summary, a violation of the standard of care does not 
automatically translate into a violation of the standard of liability.  
In corporate law, the standards of conduct diverge from the 
standards of review; they are not synonymous.44 
Thus, the Shields court made three mistakes.  First, it confused 
the codified standard of care with the common law’s BJR.  Second, 
it declared the standard of care to be a codification of the BJR.  
Third, it adopted the wrong legal standard by choosing ordinary 
negligence instead of gross negligence to evaluate the director’s 
conduct. 
D. The Business Judgment Rule is Not Codified 
Shields v. Cape Fox Corp.45 asserts that Alaska Statute 
section 10.06.450(b)46 is the BJR.47  However, despite widespread 
 
 41. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091–92 (italics added; internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“[U]nder the 
business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross 
negligence . . . .”); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 424 (D. 
Ariz. 1994) (“[T]he court could find no case in which a court held that the business 
judgment rule could be overcome by a showing of mere negligence.  If it could, the 
rule would provide very little protection to directors.”).  The only counter-
example is Theriot v. Bourg, 691 So.2d 213, 222 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that 
the standard for imposing liability on directors is not gross negligence). 
 44. Eisenberg, supra note 36, at 443–45. 
 45. 42 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2002). 
 46. ALASKA STAT. §  10.06.450 (2006). 
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adoption of the Model Act in Alaska and elsewhere, “the [BJR] 
remains uncodified.”48  Alaska’s version of the Model Act, section 
10.06.450(b),49 and its parallel, section 10.06.483(e) (the duty of care 
for corporate officers),50 is not the BJR but is simply a statutory 
“Standard[] of Conduct for Directors” that codifies their duty of 
care.51  To this end, the principal authorities on the topic agree that 
the BJR remains uncodified in all jurisdictions.52  Indeed, neither 
the original Model Business Corporation Act of 1969 nor its 
revision in 1984 makes any claim of codifying the BJR.53  The 1984 
version expressly states the contrary.54 
 
 47. Shields, 42 P.3d at 1091 (“The business judgment rule is set out in AS 
10.06.450(b).”). 
 48. Branson, supra note 37, at 632–33. 
 49. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006). 
 50. Id. § 10.06.483(e) (2006) (“An officer shall perform the duties of the office 
in good faith and with that degree of care, including reasonable inquiry, that an 
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances.”). 
 51. “Standards of Conduct for Directors” is the title of section 8.30 of the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA), MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 
8.30 (2005), which in turn replicates former Model Business Code Act (MBCA) 
section 35, MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 35 (1969) (amended 1973), from which 
Alaska’s present law has descended, ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b).  The legislative 
history—the Official Comment—of section 10.06.450 of the Alaska Statutes 
describes the purpose of the law as “the articulation of a standard for the 
discharge of the duty of care which must be observed by directors” and “the duty 
of care to be observed by a corporate director.”  Similarly, the Comment to 
ALASKA STAT. §  10.06.450 describes one of its purposes as to provide “a definition 
of the standard of care according to which officers are to discharge their 
responsibilities to the corporation.”  1987 HOUSE-SENATE JOINT JOURNAL 
SUPPLEMENT No. 9, 98–101, 113 (May 7, 1987) (providing the Alaska Code 
Revision Commission’s official commentary on Chapter 10.06 of the Alaska 
Corporations Code).  The Comment to ALASKA STAT. §  10.06.483 is similar (“a 
definition of the standard of care” for officers). 
 52. See e.g., BLOCK ET AL., supra note 27, at 100–06 (“The [ABA] Committee 
on Corporate Laws determined that the rule is better left as an uncodified 
equitable doctrine.”); see also FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 20, §§ 1035–40. 
 53. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1984).  According to the official 
comments, the drafters purposely left it to the courts to sort out the relationship, if 
any, between directors’ statutory duty of care and the business judgment rule.  
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. (1984). 
 54. MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.) (“Section 8.30 
does not try to codify the business judgment rule.”), reprinted in BRANSON, supra 
note 21, § 7.01 n.8; see id. § 7.02, at 328 (“The business judgment rule is by and 
large uncodified.”); see also FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 20, § 1038 (“The 
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The error in Shields v. Cape Fox Corp. can be understood by 
examining the Model Act’s treatment of the standard of care and 
of the BJR in sections 8.30 and 8.31, respectively.55  The Alaska 
duty of care statute, section 10.06.450(b) is taken almost verbatim 
from section 8.30 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 
(RMBCA).56  Alaska’s statute adds only an express requirement of 
“reasonable inquiry” to the Model Act’s language.57  In all other 
respects, the operative clauses are identically worded.  Instead of 
being a codification of the BJR, Alaska Statute 
section 10.06.450(b) and RMBCA section 8.30 are codifications of 
the common law duty of care applicable to corporate directors.58  
The Official Comment to RMBCA section 8.30 makes this clear: 
“[t]he elements of the [BJR] and the circumstances for its 
application are continuing to be developed by the courts.  Section 
8.30 does not try to codify the BJR or to delineate the differences 
between that defensive rule and the section’s standards of director 
conduct.”59 
In an effort to reduce the confusion about the duty of care in 
section 8.30 (Standards of Conduct for Directors), a new section 
was added to the revised Model Act in 1999.  The new section, 
section 8.31 (Standards of Liability for Directors), arguably is a 
partial codification of the BJR, or at least a suggestion or proposal 
for codification.  The Official Comment to section 8.31 explains that 
the BJR is a common law rule, not a statute: “the operative elements of 
the standard of judicial review commonly referred to as the BJR have 
been widely recognized [and] courts have used a number of different 
word formulations to articulate the concept.”60  “Section 8.31 does not 
codify the [BJR] as a whole.”61 
 
business judgment rule has not been expressly codified in any state corporation 
statute nor in any version of the Model Business Corporation Act.”). 
 55. 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002) (“The business judgment rule is set out 
in AS 10.06.450(b).”). 
 56. Compare ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (2006), with MODEL BUS. CORP. 
ACT § 8.30 (2005). 
 57. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) (“and with the care, including 
reasonable inquiry . . .”). 
 58. See, e.g., BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.04 (“Relationship of the Business 
Judgment Rule to the Duty of Care”). The difference between the duty of care 
and the Business Judgment Rule is also explained in HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra 
note 20, §§ 14.4–.5, which also distinguishes the different roles of RMBCA §§ 8.30 
and 8.31. 
 59. 2 MOD. BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-163 (3d ed. 2005 Supp.), reprinted in 
BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.01 n.8. 
 60. Id. at 8-67. 
 61. Id. 
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Even assuming that section 8.31 codifies part of the BJR, 
however, it has been adopted by only three states, and Alaska is not 
one of them.62  Thus, the only possible conclusion is that Alaska 
Statute section 10.06.450(b) is not the BJR. 
Professor Robert Hamilton supports this conclusion by 
distinguishing the diverse roles of RMBCA Sections 8.30 and 8.31: 
A critical and sometimes misunderstood principle is that § 8.30 is 
not the operative test for determining whether directors are 
liable for damages for failing to exercise reasonable care.  The 
proper test for liability is the “[BJR]” described in the following 
section [§ 14.5] of this Nutshell.  The 1999 amendments to the 
Model Act make this crystal clear: The revised § 8.30 is entitled 
“Standards of Conduct for Directors,” while a completely new 
§ 8.31, entitled “Standards of Liability for Directors,” is added.  
Essentially, § 8.31 codifies the “[BJR]” described in the 
following section [§ 14.5, of this Nutshell]. 
. . . . 
In a word, one should not look at the provisions of revised § 8.30 
of MBCA (1984) to determine whether directors are personally 
responsible for bad decisions.63 
There has been only one attempt at a full codification of the 
BJR—but not by a legislature.  When drafting a restatement of the 
law of corporations, the American Law Institute (ALI) distilled the 
common law BJR into this formulation, titled “Duty of Care of 
Directors and Officers; the [BJR]”: 
(c) A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good 
faith fulfills the duty under this Section [4.01] if the director or 
officer: 
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment; 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business 
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably 
believes to be appropriate under the circumstances; and 
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the 
best interests of the corporation.64 
Although still relatively new, the ALI formulation of the BJR has 
been adopted by some state courts—but not codified by their 
respective legislatures.65  Even the ALI has recognized that “[t]here 
 
 62. The three states that have adopted § 8.31 are Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
30-1-831 (2006); Iowa, IOWA CODE § 490.831 (2006); and Mississippi, MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 79-4-8.31 (2006). 
 63. HAMILTON NUTSHELL, supra note 20, § 14.4, at 449–50. 
 64. AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c). 
 65. See, e.g., Rosenfield v. Metals Selling Corp., 643 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Conn. 
1994); Omni Bank v. United S. Bank, 607 So.2d 76, 86 (Miss. 1992); cf. Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 259 n.47 (Del. 2000) (“Because [the American Law 
02__TRIEM.DOC 6/7/2007  3:19 PM 
2007] THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 37 
are no statutory formulations of the [BJR].”66  Professor Branson 
confirms that the BJR is “by and large uncodified,” despite the ALI’s 
proposed codification in section 4.01(c).67 
III.  ALASKA’S COURTS ARE NOT ALONE IN 
 CONFUSING THE DIRECTORS’ STANDARD OF CARE WITH THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
More than a dozen courts have confused the difference 
between the directors’ standard of care and the Business Judgment 
Rule.  Forty states have adopted the Model Act’s section 8.30(a), 
the standard of care provision.68  As noted above, the commentary 
to the Model Act expressly rejects the notion that it codifies the 
BJR.69  Nevertheless, courts across the country have ignored the 
commentary to section 8.30 and have pronounced that their state’s 
version of the Model Act is a codification of the BJR.70  These 
examples include courts in states that either have adopted the 
operative language of section 8.30(a) verbatim71 or have replicated 
it with substantially the same language (i.e., states like Alaska).72  
 
Institute] test also is based on the objective test of reasonableness, it could be 
argued that it is essentially synonymous with the Delaware test.  But there is room 
to argue that the Delaware test is stricter. . . . In the end, the debate may be mostly 
semantic.”). 
 66. AM. LAW INST., supra note 12, § 4.01(c) cmt. at 173. 
 67. BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.02. 
 68. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-176, 8-178 (including a statutory 
comparison). 
 69. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-42 to -43 (2005). 
 70. E.g., FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (interpreting 
California law); IBS Fin. Corp. v. Seidman & Assoc., L.L.C, 136 F.3d 940, 949 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (interpreting New Jersey law); In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 603, 
606 n.3 (D. Minn. 2004) (interpreting Minnesota law); In re Maresh, 277 B.R. 339, 
349 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001) (interpreting Ohio law); Shoen v. SAC Holding 
Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 1179 (Nev. 2006); Sadler v. Jorad, Inc., 680 N.W.2d 165, 171 
(Neb. 2004); Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 624 N.E.2d 160, 161 (N.Y. 
2004); Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp., 836 A.2d 655, 665 (Md. 2003); 
Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 1091 (Alaska 2002); Simmons v. Miller, 
544 S.E.2d 666, 675 (Va. 2001); Hanrahan v. Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d 184, 186 
(Iowa 1991); Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 996 n.3 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993); 
Krukemeier v. Krukemeier Mach. & Tool Co., Inc., 551 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1990); Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of Bridgehaven, 655 
P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Dunham v. Michael Kane Brick Co., 1994 
WL 318936, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994). 
 71. E.g., IOWA CODE § 490.830(1) (2006). 
 72. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450 (2006). 
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These courts mistakenly insist that section 8.30 codifies the BJR,73 
when in fact it really codifies the standard of care, an altogether 
different concept.  This error is especially remarkable because the 
American Bar Association’s Model Act expressly denies being a 
codification of the BJR!74  And yet these courts have ignored the 
drafters’ disavowal of any attempt to codify and have deemed the 
statute at issue to be a codification of the BJR.75  Examples of these 
cases are provided in the Appendix. 
Professor Melvin Eisenberg has said about California’s 
appellate decisions (specifically Gaillard v. Natomas Co.76) what 
this Comment says about the Alaska case law: 
[T]he court stated that Corporations Code Section 309 “codifies 
California’s business-judgment rule.”  This is incorrect.  Section 
309 codifies the standard of careful conduct, with which the 
business-judgment rule is inconsistent. 
Indeed, an argument could be made that Section 309 overturns 
the business-judgment rule, because the business-judgment rule 
is established by case law, while the standard of Section 309, 
which is inconsistent with the business-judgment rule, is 
statutory. The better position, however, is that although Section 
309 does not codify the business-judgment rule, neither does it 
overturn the rule.77 
Other commentators also have noted the confusion of courts and 
their failure to distinguish between the statutory standard of care 
and the BJR itself.  Professor Stuart Cohn, for instance, complains 
that courts have merged the two doctrinal principles into one.78 
 
 73. See FDIC, 184 F.3d at 1044 (“California Corporations Code § 309 codifies 
California’s business judgment rule.”). 
 74. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 cmt. at 8-42 (2005) (“Section 8.30 does not try 
to codify the business judgment rule . . . .”). 
 75. See examples collected in the Appendix. 
 76. 256 Cal. Rptr. 702, 710 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Section 309 codifies 
California’s business judgment rule.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 77. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION, 
WHETHER THE BUSINESS-JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD BE CODIFIED 47–48 & n.20 
(1998), available at http://www.clrc.ca.gov/pub/BKST/BKST-EisenbergBJR.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).  Professor Eisenberg cites to another example of this 
“incorrect” analysis.  See Barnes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 87, 95 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (“In California, the business judgment rule is 
codified in Corporations Code section 309, subdivision (a) . . . .” (citing Gaillard, 
256 Cal. Rptr. at 702)); see also Lehman v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411, 
418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“Section 309 . . . codified common law principles, in 
particular the business judgment rule.”). 
 78. Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance 
of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 
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However, a few courts have detected the error that so many 
jurists are committing.  In Shinn v. Thrust IV, Inc.,79 for example, 
the Washington Court of Appeals recognized the difference 
between the standard of care that was enacted in its version of 
Model Act section 8.30 and the Business Judgment Rule: 
We note that Washington courts and the Seafirst Corp. court 
appear to be mistaken in their assumption that RCW 23A.08.343 
is a codification of the [BJR]. The comments to the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act (sec. 8.30) indicate that the 
statutory language is not intended to be a codification of the 
[BJR].80 
The Maryland Court of Appeals showed similar sophistication and 
pointed a finger of blame at the Attorney General for failing to 
understand the difference: 
The Attorney General has interpreted § 2-405.1 to be a 
codification of the [BJR] . . . which is a “presumption that in 
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted 
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interest of the company.”. . . 
Contrary to the opinion of the Attorney General, § 2-405.1 and 
the [BJR] differ in that the former is the code of conduct for 
corporate directors, while the latter is an aid to judicial 
review . . . . Nevertheless, the two do overlap. For example, 
proof of the lack of good faith defeats both the presumption of 
the [BJR] and the requirements of § 2-405.1(a)(1).  The better 
position is to view the [BJR] as a presumption that corporate 
directors acted in accordance with § 2-405.1.81 
While there is nationwide error on this point, some courts and 
commentators have recognized the important distinction between a 
director’s duty of care and the BJR. 
IV.  THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE SHOULD NOT BE CODIFIED 
The descriptive analysis above makes it clear that the Business 
Judgment Rule has not been codified in Alaska.  While this 
analysis stands independent from any normative reasons against 
 
591, 604, 617–23 (1983) (lamenting courts’ and commentators’ proclivity to 
collapse fully the standard of conduct into the business judgment rule). 
 79. 786 P.2d 285 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). 
 80. Id. at 290 n.1 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 at 928 (3d ed. 1989 
supp.)). The Washington Code, while placing the clauses in a slightly different 
sequence, is worded identically to Alaska’s adoption of section 8.30 of the Model 
Act.  See WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300 (2006); ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b) 
(2006). 
 81. Yost v. Early, 589 A.2d 1291, 1298 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (internal 
citation omitted).  The Maryland Code is patterned after the Model Act.  See MD. 
CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 2-405.1 (2006). 
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codification of the BJR, many such reasons exist.  Most pressing is 
the problem of how to reconcile the disparate versions of the BJR.  
There are at least three expressions of the BJR: the formulations of 
the Delaware courts, the America Law Institute (ALI), and the 
Model Act.82  There is no practical way to codify all three versions 
of the BJR, yet each of these three formulations is useful in the 
adjudication of certain types of disputes.  Indeed, it would be 
difficult to synthesize the competing formulations into one single 
enactment.  Who would write it?  What form would it take?83 
These questions illuminate a structural problem inherent in 
the codification process.  A legislature would no doubt be 
influenced by a powerful pro-management lobby that would want 
to water down and weaken director liability in any codification of 
the BJR, thereby giving greater protections to management.  The 
risk that the legislature would cave to the corporate lobby is largely 
alleviated when the formulation of the BJR is left to the courts. 
More important is the substantive problem: the legislature 
would have a difficult choice to make between the competing 
versions.  Professor Eisenberg suggests that the California statute 
should be amended to blend ALI section 4.01(c) into its present 
text.84  However, he could just as well advance RMBCA section 
 
 82. For a comparison, see BRANSON, supra note 21, § 7.02; Balotti & Hanks, 
supra note 19, at 1337–39.  There are, of course, other formulations of the BJR 
throughout the above-cited scholarship and case law. 
 83. The Alaska Code Revision Commission spent a decade revising Chapter 
10.05 of the Alaska Statutes, the Alaska’s version of the original Model Act that 
was repealed in 1988 and replaced with the current section 10.06, a task supervised 
by the Commission’s outside counsel and legal expert, Professor Daniel Fessler of 
UC–Davis.  When he wrote the definitive article about the new Alaska 
Corporations Code, Chapter 10.06, Professor Fessler said nothing about codifying 
the Business Judgment Rule, a feat which to corporate scholars would be like 
climbing Mt. St. Elias solo or hitting sixty home runs in a single season.  See 
Daniel William Fessler, The Alaska Corporations Code: The Forty-Ninth State 
Claims the Middle Ground, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 51 (1990).  Both Professor 
Fessler’s law review article and the Commission’s Official Comment are silent 
about the BJR and any putative codification.  See id.; 1987 HOUSE-SENATE 
JOINT JOURNAL SUPPLEMENT No. 9, 98-101 (May 7, 1987). 
 84. EISENBERG, supra note 77, at 49–50.  Professor Branson has made the 
same suggestion for using the ALI proposal to codify the BJR in Hong Kong.  
Douglas M. Branson, Balancing the Scales: A Statutory Business Judgment Rule 
for Hong Kong?, 34 HONG KONG L.J. 303, 320 (2004) (arguing that “Hong Kong 
should adopt a statutory business judgment rule” but mentioning reasons 
advanced against codification when it was proposed in Australia).  The ALI’s 
expression of the BJR has been criticized on the grounds that it is too narrow and 
that it removes too much of the director’s safe harbor by injecting requirements of 
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8.31 or the operative language from a judicial expression of the 
rule, such as Delaware’s formulation in Aronson v. Lewis.85  Indeed, 
there are numerous formulations of the BJR in treatises and in the 
legal literature.  Even if consensus could be achieved, any 
codification would necessarily be exclusive to some degree, almost 
certainly including conduct that would otherwise be excluded, and 
vice-versa. 
This leads to the final problem with codification: a legislative 
rule would lack the flexibility of the common law rule.86  The 
common law method is able to incorporate and apply social 
policies, such as the policy grounds for the BJR, while a legislative 
rule would be more constrained.87  It would also be difficult to 
avoid the problem of “dueling statutes,” both between the standard 
of care and the BJR and among the various states, each of which 
would have its own codified version of the rule.  In sum, the 
present common law rule has worked for more than a century.88  As 
the saying goes: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. 
 
reasonable inquiry and rational basis.  See Donald E. Pease, Aronson v. Lewis: 
When Demand Is Excused and Delaware’s Business Judgment Rule, 9 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 39, 74–76 & n.177 (1984) (relating criticisms of the Business Roundtable, 
an association of chief executive officers of major U.S. companies). 
 85. 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Brehm 
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000) (changing the standard of appellate 
review from abuse of discretion to de novo).  Aronson is the most frequently cited 
judicial formulation of the BJR. 
 86. Aside, The Common Law Origins of the Infield Fly Rule, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1474, 1480 (1975) (arguing that the creation of a common law rule is an 
incremental process of refinement “in which common law precedents are 
employed to mold existing remedies to new situations”). 
 87. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 19–51 (1960) 
(listing fourteen “strongly stabilizing factors” as reasons why the common law 
tradition is superior to other methods of resolving disputes); RICHARD A. 
WASSERSTROM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION—TOWARD A THEORY OF LEGAL 
JUSTIFICATION 75–79 (1961) (noting that legal precedent imposes a restraint upon 
judges and limits the variation in judicial decision-making). 
 88. See EISENBERG, supra note 26, at 26–37 (explaining the role of policy as 
a social proposition in common law reasoning); id. at 27 (noting that “[t]he 
administrability policy is that the applicability of a legal rule should not depend on 
information of a kind that cannot be reliably determined by courts,” such as the 
information directors use in making business decisions); id. at 32 (“policies figure 
so pervasively in legal reasoning”). 
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V.  CONCLUSION: CORPORATE  
LAW NEEDS A COURSE CORRECTION 
The standard of care that guides directors’ conduct is codified 
in almost every state, but the Business Judgment Rule is an 
uncodified common law rule that protects the business decisions of 
corporate directors and officers when they are brought into court.  
Some courts have conflated these two notions.  These courts have 
mistakenly declared that the standard of care is the BJR, which it 
surely is not. 
The BJR is important to all corporate directors, officers, and 
shareholders.89  It commands special prominence in Alaska because 
the state courts frequently are called upon to evaluate, ex post, the 
decisions and policies of corporate directors in Alaska Native 
corporations.  These decisions are a source of frequent and 
contentious litigation in Alaska.90  For the sake of all interested 
parties, the Alaska Supreme Court should correct the erroneous 
dictum in Shields v. Cape Fox that mistakenly refers to a statutory 
formulation of the Business Judgment Rule and thereby adopts the 
wrong legal standard for determining liability.  A correction will 
ease the burdens on the lower courts in corporate litigation and will 
move Alaska’s corporate jurisprudence towards the mainstream of 
modern legal thought.  The dozen or more other courts around the 
nation that have committed the same error should make the same 
course correction. 
 
 89. Bainbridge, supra note 24, at 83 n.1 (“The business judgment rule 
pervades every aspect of state corporate law, from the review of allegedly 
negligent decisions by directors, to self-dealing transactions, to board decisions to 
seek dismissal of shareholder litigation, and so on.”). 
 90. See, e.g., Broad v. Sealaska, 85 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1996) (involving a 
shareholders’ challenge to directors’ approval of discriminatory distributions); 
Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., 45 P.3d 1208, 1211 n.3 (Alaska 2002) (involving 
whether directors can favor local shareholders, including directors’ relatives, in a 
corporate hire program); Sierra v. Goldbelt, 25 P.3d 697 (Alaska 2000) (involving 
whether directors must disclose their resolution when asking shareholders to 
approve amendment to articles of incorporation); Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 
939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997) (involving a shareholders’ challenge to directors’ 
adoption of a discriminatory life insurance program for local, original 
shareholders); Moses v. McGarvey, 614 P.2d 1363 (Alaska 1980) (involving a 
shareholders’ challenge to the annual meeting and election of directors); Aleut 
Corp. v. McGarvey, 573 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1978) (involving a dispute about 
election of directors).  Of course, Shields fits into this category as well. 
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Appendix: Examples from case law in  
which courts mistakenly have said the BJR is codified: 
 
State Case Statute 
AK† Shields v. Cape Fox Corp., 42 P.3d 1083, 





Lehman v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
411, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); Barnes v. 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 87, 95 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 256 Cal. 
Rptr. 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); see also 
FDIC v. Castetter, 184 F.3d 1040, 1044 (9th 
Cir. 1999). 
CAL. CORP. 
CODE § 309 
 
CT†‡ Dunham v. Michael Kane Brick Co., 1994 




IA† Hanrahan v. Kruidenier, 473 N.W.2d 184, 
186 (Iowa 1991). 
IOWA CODE § 
490.830 
ID†‡ Jordan v. Hunter, 865 P.2d 990, 996 n.3 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1993). 
IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 30-1-35 
IN† Krukemeier v. Krukemeier Machine & Tool 
Co., 551 N.E.2d 885, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990). 
IND. CODE § 
23-1-35-1 
MD† Sadler v. Dimensions Healthcare Corp, 836 
A.2d 655, 665 (Md. 2003). 
MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. 
& ASS’NS § 2-
405.1 
MN†‡ In re Xcel Energy, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 603, 606 
n.3 (D. Minn. 2004). 
MINN. STAT. § 
302A.251 (1) 
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State Case Statute 
NJ† IBS Financial Corp. v. Seidman & Associates, 




NV** Shoen v. SAC Holding Corp., 137 P.3d 1171, 




NY† Lindner Fund, Inc. v. Waldbaum, Inc., 624 




OH†‡ In re Maresh, 277 B.R. 339, 349 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2001). 
OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 
1701.59(B) 





WA†‡91 Schwarzmann v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners 
of Bridgehaven, 655 P.2d 1177, 1180 n.1 






 91. See also Seafirst Corp. v. Jenkins, 644 F. Supp. 1152, 1159 (W.D. Wash. 
1986) (interpreting Washington law and making the same mistake); Shinn v. 
Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285, 290 n.1 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that the 
Seafirst court mistakenly assumed that the Washington statute codified the BJR). 
 92. This statute was repealed after Schwarzmann was decided and was 
reenacted as WASH. REV. CODE § 23B.08.300(1) (2006), which is worded 
identically to the Alaska Statute. 
† Has adopted the principal operative language of MBCA § 8.30(a): “Each 
member of the board of directors, when discharging the duties of a director, shall 
act: (1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in 
the best interests of the corporation.” 
‡ Has adopted language identical to that which Alaska has adopted in 
ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.450(b). 
** Has adopted language similar to MBCA § 8.30(a). 
